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The convergence characteristics of an iterative method for solving area search games
were investigated. This method, Fictitious Play, was first introduced by G. W. Brown
and solves two-person zero-sum games by having each player sequentially select a pure
strategy based on the combined past actions of his opponent. The Fictitious Play
method was successfully implemented for an area search game in which two players, a
searcher and a target, move independently through an area. In this game, the payoff is
the number of detections of the target by the searcher. For each iteration of the game,
an upper and lower bound on the value of the game were determined and as the number
of iterations of the game increased, these bounds converged to the actual solution. In
the games examined, t!*e convergence of the bounds was closely approximated by a
power function (cut*), with large games converging more slowly. Because of the ob-
served symmetrical convergence of the bounds, an accurate approximation of the value





B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 1
C. PREVIOUS WORK 2
II. METHODOLOGY 3
A. FINITE MATRIX GAME 3
B. FICTITIOUS PLAY 5
1. Convergence Rate 7
C. DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING 7
1. Updating Cell Occupancy Probabilities, X,{i) and Y,(i) 10
III. DATA GENERATION 12
A. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 12
1. Finite Matrix Game 12
2. Fictitious Play 12
3. Dynamic Programming 12
B. PROGRAM VALIDATION 13
IV. DATA ANALYSIS 14
A. CONVERGENCE PROPERTIES 14
B. CONVERGENCE SYMMETRY 14
C. CONVERGENCE RATE 19
V. CONCLUSIONS 22
A. SUMMARY OF CONVERGENCE PROPERTIES 22
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 22
1. Comparison of Linear Programming and Fictitious Play Approaches . . 22
APPENDIX A. COMPARISONS OF CONVERGENCE OF UPPER AND
LOWER BOUNDS ON VALUE OF THE GAME 24
IV
APPENDIX B. COMPARISON OF MIDPOINT AND ACTUAL SOLUTION .27
APPENDIX C. COMPARISON OF CONVERGENCE TO THE ACTUAL SOL-
UTION OF A BOUND AND MIDPOINT 29
APPENDIX D. POWER FUNCTION FITTING OF DATA FOR VARIOUS
GAME SIZES 31
LIST OF REFERENCES 33
BIBLIOGRAPHY 34
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 35
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. COMPARISON OF LINEAR PROGRAMMING AND FICTITIOUS
PLAY SOLUTIONS 13
Table 2. MIDPOINT SOLUTIONS FOR MULTIPLE REPLICATIONS 16
Table 3. REPLICATIONS TO INSURE 0.005 ABSOLUTE DEVIATION FOR
BOUND AND MIDPOINT 19
Table 4. POWER FUNCTION FIT OF DATA WITH R SQUARE VALUES . . 21
Table 5. MIDPOINT SOLUTIONS FOR MULTIPLE REPLICATIONS 27




Figure 1. Finite Matrix Area Search Game 4
Figure 2. Network of Searcher's Path Through Search Area 10
Figure 3. Convergence of Upper and Lower Bounds With Midpoint Solutions .. 15
Figure 4. Comparison of Separation Between Bounds for Various Matrix Sizes . . 17
Figure 5. Comparison of Convergence of an Upper Bound and Midpoint 18
Figure 6. Comparison of Convergence of Upper Bound for Various Game Sizes .20
Figure 7. Convergence of Upper and Lower Bounds With Midpoint: 3x3 and 4x4
Matrix 24
Figure 8. Convergence of Upper and Lower Bounds With Midpoint: 5x5 and 6x6
Matrix 25
Figure 9. Convergence of Upper and Lower Bounds With Midpoint: 1x6 Matrix . 26
Figure 10. Convergence of a Bound and Midpoint for a 3x3 and 4x4 Matrix Game 29
Figure 11. Convergence of a Bound and Midpoint for a 5x5 and 6x6 Matrix Game 30
Figure 12. Convergence Data From 3x3 and 4x4 Matrix Fitted With Power Func-
tion 31






The convergence properties of a computational method for solving finite matrix
games was investigated. This method, Fictitious Play, was introduced by George W.
Brown [Ref. 1] and is an iterative method based on the imagined play of the two game
participants. At each fictitious play iteration, Brown's technique computes upper and
lower bounds on the value of the game and approximates the optimal strategy for each
player. For the games examined here, the convergence characteristics of the upper and
lower bounds allow for an accurate approximation of the value of the game after rela-
tively few iterations. Although the convergence rate of the bounds to the value of the
game is slow, this iterative process allows the solving of large matrix problems which
tend to become cumbersome with other common methods, e.g., Linear Programming.
Very little is known about the convergence properties of Fictitious Play, and it is the
purpose of this study to experimentally examine the rate of convergence for a specific
two-person zero-sum area search game.
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This study was motivated by an area search game in which a searcher looks for an
evading target, each moving among a finite number of cells in discrete time periods. The
searcher and target each independently select a path through the search area (a pure
strategy) or some probabilistic combination of paths (a mixed strategy). These paths
are feasible combinations of cells serially connected over a time period T. That is, if the
current cell is i, the next cell must be selected from a set C, of neighboring cells. Al-
though it will be assumed here, it is not necessary that cell / have the same set of
neighbors for both searcher and target. For each game play, the searcher and target
select feasible T-time period paths. The payoff is the expected number of times the
searcher and target are in the same cell in the same time period. The searcher attempts
to maximize and the target minimize this payoff.
Because the number of paths can be quite large, Fictitious Play was selected to solve
this game. It soon became evident that the rate of convergence of Fictitious Play would
determine whether or not it was a useful solution method.
C. PREVIOUS WORK
Fictitious Play was first introduced by G.W. Brown [Ref. 1] as an iterative process
for solving finite two-person zero-sum games. Brown hypothesized that the rate of
convergence to the value of the game was proportional to \jn , where n is the number
of fictitious play iterations. Julia Robinson [Ref. 2] proved the process converged, thus
formally demonstrating its potential validity as a solution method. J.M. Danskin
[Ref. 3] showed that Fictitious Play applies to continuous two-person zero-sum games
as well. S. Karlin [Ref. 4] hypothesized that the rate of convergence was \j-Jn , but
further asserted that in practice it could be expected to converge more rapidly. No
further work or relevant information on the convergence properties of Brown's Fictitious
Play had been discovered up to the time of this study.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. FINITE MATRIX GAME
The area search game presented here can be represented as a finite matrix game.
The elements of the payoff matrix are the number of detections of the target by the
searcher, i.e., the number of time periods when the searcher and target are in the same
cell. Figure 1 on page 4 depicts this matrix game, where
a, = pure strategy i of searcher (a feasible T-time period path),
Pj = pure strategy j of target (a feasible T-time period path), and
r
tJ
= number of detections
for /'= \,2,...,n andj= l,2,...,m.
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TARGET










Figure 1. Finite Matrix Area Search Game
In this finite matrix game, the searcher can calculate a security level Vs , as
Vs = max[min/ry].
i ' j
Similarly the target can calculate a security level VT , as
VT— min[maxr,7].
J i
In all cases, Vs < VT and if Vs = VT = V , the game has an equilibrium or saddle point.
Associated with this saddle point is the value of the game V, and optimal pure strategies
a
f/
- and (1* .
In games where equilibrium points do not exist, mixed strategies can be used to
specify a value of the game. A mixed strategy is a set of pure strategies a, , that are
weighted with probabilities x,
,
where
/ xt = 1 and Xj > 0.
For the searcher, a mixed strategy is denoted as X= (x^, x2<x2 ,..., xna. n), and for the
target, it is denoted as Y = (yiPi,y2Pii~->ymPm)- With mixed strategies, the security levels
for the searcher and target are calculated respectively by:




John von Neumann [Ref. 5] showed that
vs =vT =v,
where V is the value of the game. The searcher mixed strategy which achieves V is
A'*
,
the searcher's optimal mixed strategy; and, the target mixed strategy which achieves
Kis F*, the target's optimal mixed strategy.
B. FICTITIOUS PLAY
Fictitious Play is an iterative method for approximating the V, X* and Y* for a
two-person zero-sum game. This method was first introduced by George W. Brown
[Ref. 1] and is conceptually described as follows:
The iterative method in question can be loosely characterized by the fact that it rests
on the traditional statistician's philosophy of basing future decisions on the relevant
past history. Visualize two statisticians, perhaps ignorant of min-max theory, play-
ing many plays of the same discrete zero-sum game. One might naturally expect a
statistician to keep track of the opponent's past play and, in the absence of a more
sophisticated calculation, perhaps to choose at each play the optimum pure strategy
against the mixture represented by all the opponent's past plays. For calculation
purposes the rule used here is that strategies will be named in turn for each side,
choosing at each turn a pure strategy which is optimal against the cumulative his-
tory of the opponent's play to date. [Ref. 1: p. 374]
The method is a relatively simple iterative process that directs a player to select an op-
timal pure strategy in response to the current empirical mixed strategy of his opponent.
Applied to the area search game, an iteration of this procedure consists of the following
steps.
1. Based on an equal weighting of all the searcher's pure strategies observed so far
by the target, the target selects the best pure strategy response.
2. A lower bound on the value of the game is computed as the expected number of
detections when the searcher plays his current mixed strategy and the target selects
the best pure strategy response.
3. Based on an equal weighting of all the target's pure strategies observed so far by
the searcher, the searcher selects the best pure strategy response.
4. An upper bound on the value of the game is computed as the expected number of
detections when the target plays his current mixed strategy and the searcher selects
the best pure strategy response. (Go to step 1 for next iteration)
The procedure begins with the target assuming an arbitrary searcher strategy. As the
number of iterations of the game are increased, the upper and lower bounds on the value
of the game converge toward the actual value, and any converging subsequence of the
empirical mixed strategies is an optimal mixed strategy. The convergence rate has been
observed to be quite slow, so an effective solution might require a large number of Fic-
titious Play iterations. The process is considered complete when the difference between
the bounds on the value of the game is sufficiently small. At this point an approximate
value of the game and approximate optimal strategies for both players are obtained.
The empirical mixed strategies after the klh iteration of Fictitious Play, A* and B\
are calculated from the relative frequencies of all the previously selected pure strategies
of the searcher and target respectively. That is, consider the game that has been repli-
cated k times and the searcher has selected pure strategies (a 1 , a 2 ,..., a'), where a; is the
pure strategy chosen in the jth replication. If r
{
denotes the number of times pure
strategy a, is used, then the pure strategy a, is weighted with the relative frequency —
.
This results in the empirical mixed strategy
A = (— a,,—
a
2 ....,— aj
for the searcher and similarlv
for the target.
1. Convergence Rate
The convergence rate of the upper and lower bounds of the value of the game
was first hypothesized by G.W. Brown [Ref. 1] to be \/n , where n is the number of it-
erations. He supported this hypothesis by relating the iterative method, as a difference
equation, to a set of differential equations for which a convergence rate could be shown.
The most recently found discussion in the literature on the convergence rate was pre-
sented by Samuel Karlin [Ref. 4]. He stated:
It is conjectured that the process converges at a rate I'Jk , where k is the number
of iterations. In actual cases, it is found that the process is far more efficient than
is expected theoretically. [Ref. 4: p. 183]
No reference was made to how or where this conjectured rate of convergence was de-
termined. It appears that the rate of convergence of Fictitious Play is unclear and re-
quires further investigation.
C. DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING
To use Fictitious Play to solve this area search game, both the searcher and target
must be able to calculate the best pure strategy response to any mixed strategy of the
opponent. If the area search game were small enough to allow a total enumeration of
searcher and target pure strategies (i.e., the payoff matrix could be completely specified),
then choosing the best pure strategy response would be simple. Assuming, for example,




y; = probability of target selecting column j, and
r.j = column j of the payoff matrix.
The target could likewise find the best column response to any probabilistic combination
of rows.
For the area search problem presented here, it is assumed that the large number of
possible pure strategies (i.e., paths) available for the searcher and target makes total
enumeration impractical. Another method must be used to determine pure strategy re-
sponses. The procedure employed is Dynamic Programming. Assume, for example, that
the target plays a mixed strategy which is known to the searcher. That is, the searcher
knows all the paths that the target might select and the probability of the target selecting
each path. From this information the searcher computes
K,(/),/=l,...,iV and t=l,...,T,
which is the probability of the target being in cell / in time period t. These probabilities
contain all the information necessary for the searcher to select his best response. The
searcher, as it turns out, does not care what mixed strategy the target uses as long as the
searcher can determine the Y
t
{i) values.
The searcher can now use Dynamic Programming to compute the best pure strategy
response to }',(')• The recursion for /=1,...,A' and r = 2,...,7"is




_^i) = argmax{ >',(/) + F,(/)},
where
V,{j) = maximum obtainable expected number of target detections from time t+ 1 to
T when the searcher starts in time period t and is in cell j.
C, = the set of cells accessible from cell i in one time period by the searcher, and
d,{i) = the best next cell to search given the searcher is in cell i in time period t.
The recursion begins with
^0 = , /=1,...,/V.
By solving a similar dynamic program, the target can determine his best pure strategy
response to any searcher cell occupancy probabilities, X
t
{i).
To demonstrate the validity of this recursion, it is observed that
T
',_!(/) = max{E[# detections at time /|search is in cell,/ at time /]
+ E[# detections from time / + 1 to 7]search is in cellj at
time / and conducted optimally from time /
-f 1 to time 7]}
= max{ }',(/) + V
t(j)}.
The first equality follows from the definition of V,{J) and the fact that the expected value
of a sum of random variables is the sum of the expected values. The second equality
results from conditioning on the target's cell at time / and (again) the definition of V,(j).
It is noted that the searcher's problem is that of finding the longest (i.e., most prof-
itable) path through the Nx T acyclic network in Figure 2 on page 10. When the
searcher reaches node j in time period /, the payoff Y,(j) is received. Arcs connect each
cell / with all cells in the set of accessible cells C.
TIME (t)
t=i t=2 t=t t=T
1-1
-^-<ix—
~A / ° ° °
I-2 <D vD^-X2) • • (D
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Figure 2. Network of Searcher's Path Through Search Area
1. Updating Cell Occupancy Probabilities, A',(0 and F,(i)
In each iteration of fictitious play, the searcher and target update
Y,(i) and X,(i) respectively, based on the number of iterations performed so far and the
opponents most recently observed pure strategy. Assigning equal weights at all observed
pure strategies, the update procedure is straight forward. If the searcher was in cell / at
time / in the most recently observed pure strategy, then
Xf(!) =
' )^-'M + |,
and if the searcher was not in cell / at time t
,
10
Af(0=(^1 )^- , 0).
Likewise, if the target was in cell / at time / in the most recently observed pure strategy,
then
and if the target was not in cell i at time t
,
Here k is the current iteration number and Xk,{i) and Yk(i) are the empirical cell occu-




The upper and lower bound data required for this study were generated by a modi-
fied version of an existing computer program provided by Professor J. Eagle at the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The modified version was developed to
allow a greater flexibility for variable manipulation. Conceptually the program was di-
vided into three major areas dealing with Game Theory, Fictitious Play and Dynamic
Programming.
1. Finite Matrix Game
The initial set up of the finite matrix game required inputs from the user that
included search area size, duration of search, replications of game and initial strategy of
players. Within this portion, all the possible decision paths (states) for adjacent cell path
movements during a time period (stage) were determined. The initial inputs and adja-
cent cell paths were required for transition into the fictitious play portion.
2. Fictitious Play
The Fictitious Play portion was the driver of the iterative process. It was re-
sponsible for determining the mixed strategies of the players and evaluating the bounds
on the value of the game. As the best pure strategies were determined, the bounds were
reevaluated. The iterative process was started by the selection of an optimal pure
strategy for the target against the searcher's initial inputed strategy. A new lower bound
on the value of the game was computed. If it was greater (i.e., tighter) than the current
lower bound, it was retained. Otherwise the new lower bound was ignored. A mixed
strategy for the target was then determined from the old mixed strategy and the pure
strategy just selected. The process of selecting the best pure strategy, calculating and
evaluating the opponent's bound on the game, and determining a new mixed strategy
was then accomplished for the searcher against the target's current mixed strategy.
Conducting this process once for each player constituted a replication of the game. The
determination of the optimal pure strategies and the bounds on the value of the game
for each player required the Dynamic Programming portion of the program.
3. Dynamic Programming
Dynamic Programming provided the optimization procedure for the iterative
process and was considered the optimizer portion. It determined the best search paths
12
for each player in response to the mixed strategies of his opponent. The payoff (ex-
pected number of detections) was maximized for the searcher and minimized for the
target. These paths became the optimal pure strategies required for the calculation of
empirical mixed strategies in the iterative process. Associated bounds on the value of
the game were calculated for each iteration.
B. PROGRAM VALIDATION
The computer program was validated with results from a Linear Programming sol-
ution to the area search game, provided by Professor A. Washburn at the Naval Post-
graduate School in Monterey, California. A comparison of the Linear Programming
solutions and the Fictitious Play approximations is presented in Table 1. The fictitious
play approximations were the computed midpoints between the upper and lower bounds
on the value of the game after 50,000 replications. The difference between the :olutions
of the two approaches is represented as an absolute value. The validity of the fictitious
play computer program was supported by these results.
Table 1. COMPARISON OF LINEAR PROGRAMMING AND FICTITIOUS











1x6 11 1.2900 1.2902 0.0002
3x3 6 0.3548 0.3550 0.0002
4x4 S 0.2553 0.2554 0.0001
5x5 10 0.2012 0.2015 0.0003




In validating the Fictitious Play approach, it became apparent that an examination
of convergence properties was needed. The only relevant information available per-
tained to convergence rates and was conflicting [Ref. 1,4]. In order to reasonably predict
a solution, an understanding of convergence characteristics was required. The focus of
the study became the investigation of convergence properties with specific emphasis on
convergence symmetry and rate.
B. CONVERGENCE SYMMETRY
The upper and lower bounds on the value of the game converge to a solution as the
number of replications increases. This was proven mathematically by J. Robinson [Ref.
2]. It was observed in this study that the bounds tended to converge symmetrically.
Graphically this is displayed for a 4x4 matrix in Figure 3. This characteristic was pres-
ent in all cases examined, which included various matrix sizes, shapes and initial player
positionings. Additional graphic presentations are located in Appendix A.
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CONVERGENCE OF UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDS WITH MIDPOINT








Figure 3. Convergence of Upper and Loner Bounds With Midpoint Solutions
Since the solution to the game lies lies between the bounds and the bounds appear
to converge symmetrically, using the midpoint of the bounds as an approximation to the
value of the game seemed to be a reasonable approach. This method proved to be very
successful as evidenced in Table 1 on page 13. Further investigation revealed that
through the use of the midpoint method an accurate approximation could be predicted
without requiring a large number of replications. This is supported by a comparison of
15
the midpoint and actual solution for various replications in Table 2. Additional com-
parisons are available in Appendix B.




















Normally the fictitious play process is considered complete when the difference be-
tween the bounds achieves some specified positive tolerance level. A small tolerance
level results in an accurate solution. It was observed that as the game increased in size,
more replications were required to obtain the same tolerance level. This is illustrated in
Ficure 4.
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COMPARISON OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDS FOR VARIOUS MATRIX SIZES
SHOWING MINIMUM NUMBER OF REPUCATIONS
FOR A MAXIMUM TOLERANCE OF 0.01 SEPARATION




Figure 4. Comparison of Separation Between Bounds for Various Matrix Sizes
Figure 5 on page 18 compares the convergence of the midpoint solution to that of
the upper bound for a typical game. The midpoint was in all cases observed to achieve
a much more accurate estimate of the value of the game than provided by either of the
bounds. For example, 18,000 replications were required in a 4x4 game to bring the up-
per bound within 0.005 of the actual solution; and only 400 replications were required
to bring the midpoint to the same absolute deviation.
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COMPARISON OF CONVERGENCE OF BOUND AND MIDPOINT




Figure 5. Comparison of Convergence of an Upper Bound and Midpoint
By examining further comparisons in Appendix C, it can be seen that as the game size
increases, the number of replications required by the bound to guarantee a preset abso-
lute deviation also increases. The number of replications required to give the same ab-
solution deviation for the midpoint solution appears to be considerably less influenced
by increasing game sizes. A comparison between the bound and midpoint replications
required to insure a 0.005 absolute deviation for various game sizes is provided in
18
Table 3. The midpoint method is seen to provide an accurate approximation to the
solution very quickly and is not greatly influenced by the game size.












6x6 > 50,000 500
It can be concluded from the above observations that for the games examined the
bounds converge symmetrically to a solution. The midpoint between the bounds con-
verges much more rapidly to the solution than do the bounds. Additionally, the mid-
point method is apparently not greatly hindered by an increase in game size.
C. CONVERGENCE RATE
The convergence rate for the Fictitious Play process is not clearly understood. For
the area search game, the convergence rates for various size games were experimentally
found to be slower than the hypothesized rate 1 ,'/?. The rate of convergence of the



















Figure 6. Comparison of Convergence of Upper Bound for Various Game Sizes
It can be clearly seen in Figure 6, that as the game sizes increase the associated time
(i.e., number of replications) required to reach a specific deviation also increases. That
is, the bounds take longer to converge for a larger games.
Experimentally the data were fitted with the power function (y = an*), where n re-
presented the number of replications. This fit was accomplished by noting that for this
power function
In y = In a + /? In n
which allowed a linear regression of In y versus In n to be done. Because of the
large amount of data, every fiftieth replication was fitted. The exponent (/?), which re-
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presents the convergence rate, appeared to range from the lower hypothesized value of
-1.0 and generally increased as the game size increased. The largest game examined was
a 10x10 matrix with only 6,850 replications due to the large amount of computer time
required to generate the data. Table 4 provides the values of (a) and (/?) for the fitted
power functions of various games examined. In all cases, the power function provided
an excellent fit to the data. This is supported by the closeness to 1.0 of the multiple
correlation coefficient (R SQUARE), displayed in Table 4. A graphical presentation of
the fitted data is provided in Appendix C.
Table 4. POWER FUNCTION FIT OF DATA WITH R SQUARE VALUES
MATRIX SIZE
POWER FUNCTION (y = o.n?) R SQUARE
a P
2x2 0.29366 -0.79710 0.973
3x3 0.29687 -0.65306 0.972
4x4 0.40S66 -0.59259 0.993
5x5 0.68224 -0.60602 0.995
6x6 0.65516 -0.56800 0.997
8x8 1.19410 -0.55711 0.993
10x10 0.78094 -0.44950 0.991
It can be concluded for this type of area search game, that the Fictitious Play ap-
proach has a convergence rate that is representative of a power function. The observed
/? values ranged from -0.7971 for the smallest game to -0.4495 for the largest. These data
suggest that Brown's hypothesized rate of 1,7? (i.e., /? = — 1) is in general too optimistic.
Additionally, Karlin's rate of \',Jn (i.e., /? = —0.5) may also be too optimistic for games
as large or larger than the 10x10, 20-time period game examined here.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY OF CONVERGENCE PROPERTIES
The fictitious play approach to the two-person zero-sum area search game was
successfully implemented. Convergence properties of the process, for this type of game,
were investigated and the following conclusions were reached.
• For the area search games examined, the upper and lower bounds on the value of
the game converge symmetrically toward a solution as the number of replications
of the game is increased.
• Because of the symmetrical convergence, the midpoint between the bounds pro-
vides an accurate approximation to the solution.
• The midpoint solution converges much more quickly to the actual solution than
do the bounds and is apparently not greatly influenced by the size of the game.
• The convergence rate of the process is representative of a power function
{y— anP ). Experimentally, the exponent (/?) was observed to vary between -0.7971
and -0.4495, and generally increased with the size of the game.
• The convergence of the bounds becomes slower as the size of the game is increased.
By observing the convergence characteristics of the Fictitious Play process, an approach
for predicting an accurate approximation of the solution was developed. This approach,
the midpoint method, required less replications of the game and provided an accurate
approximation of the solution. Because of the increased efficiency and capability to ac-
curately predict a solution, the Fictitious Play process should be considered a possible
approach to solving area search games and warrants further investigation.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
The Fictitious Play process provides a relatively simple approach to solving the area
search game. It not only produces an accurate approximation of the solution of the
game, but also provides the capability to determine a nearly optimal strategy for each
player. The following topic is recommended as a possible area for further investigation
and future study.
1. Comparison of Linear Programming and Fictitious Play Approaches
Solving the area search game with the use of computer resources can be ap-
proached by several methods. One very promising method is the Linear Programming
approach of Washburn. The major advantage of this approach is that it does not re-
quire a large amount of CPU time and gives exact answers. However, it can be very
22
demanding on memory resources, especially as the size of the games increases. In com-
parison, the fictitious play approach requires minimal memory resources but is ham-
pered by the large amount of CPU time required and gives approximate solutions. A
comparison between the Linear Programming and the Fictitious Play approach is re-
commended for future study, with emphasis on the tradeoffs between the resources of
CPU time and memory space.
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APPENDIX A. COMPARISONS OF CONVERGENCE OF UPPER AND
LOWER BOUNDS ON VALUE OF THE GAME
CONVERGENCE OF UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDS WITH MIDPOINT
3x3 MATRIX 6 TIME PERIODS 50.000 REPLICATIONS
ACTUAL SOLUTION = 0.3548

















ACTUAL' SOLUTION = 0.2553
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o o 1000 2000 3000
REPLICATIONS (x10)
4000 5000
Figure 7. Convergence of Upper and Lower Bounds With Midpoint: 3x3 and 4x4
Matrix
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CONVERGENCE OF UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDS WITH MIDPOINT
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Figure 8. Convergence of Upper and Lower Bounds With Midpoint: 5x5 and 6x6
Matrix
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CONVERGENCE OF UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDS WITH MIDPOINT
1x6 MATRIX 12 TIME PERIODS 50,000 REPLICATIONS
«- 1000 2000 3000
REPLICATIONS (x10)
4000 5000
Figure 9. Convergence of Upper and Lower Bounds With Midpoint: 1x6 Matrix
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APPENDIX B. COMPARISON OF MIDPOINT AND ACTUAL
SOLUTION







































































APPENDIX C. COMPARISON OF CONVERGENCE TO THE ACTUAL
SOLUTION OF A BOUND AND MIDPOINT
o
COMPARISON OF CONVERGENCE OF BOUND AND MIDPOINT








Figure 10. Convergence of a Bound and Midpoint for a 3x3 and 4x4 Matrix Game
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COMPARISON OF CONVERGENCE OF BOUND AND MIDPOINT










Figure 11. Convergence of a Bound and Midpoint for a 5x5 and 6x6 Matrix Game
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CONVERGENCE DATA FITTED WITH POWER FUNCTION
3x3 MATRIX 6 TIME PERIODS 50.000 REPLICATIONS













CONVERGENCE DATA FITTED WITH POWER FUNCTION






6x6 MATRIX 12 TIME PERIODS 50.000 REPLICATIONS
0.65516 x X * -0.56B
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